

**DEPARTMENT
OF
DEFENSE**



**QUARTERLY
READINESS REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS
JULY - SEPTEMBER 1998**

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE.....	PF-1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	ES-1
I. The CY 98/3 Readiness Review.....	1
-Readiness to Meet a Specific Scenario	1
-Unit Readiness	2
-Tempo.....	6
-Recruiting and Retention	6
-Year 2000 (Y2K) Status.....	8
-Joint Readiness Strategic Concerns.....	9
II. Summary.....	9
GLOSSARY	GL-1
I. The Readiness Assessment Process.....	AT-1
II Tempo.....	AT-5
C-Level Reason Codes.....	RC-1

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

PREFACE

Section 482, Title 10, United States Code provides for:

“(a) Quarterly Reports Required--Not later than 30 days after the end of each calendar-year quarter, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) shall submit to Congress a report regarding military readiness. The report for a quarter shall contain the information required by subsections (b), (d), and (e).

“(b) Readiness Problems and Remedial Actions.--Each report shall specifically describe--

“(1) Each readiness problem and deficiency identified using the assessments considered under subsection (c);

“(2) Planned remedial actions; and

“(3) The key indicators and other relevant information related to each identified problem and deficiency.

“(c) Consideration of Readiness Assessments--The information required under subsection (b) to be included in the report for a quarter shall be based on readiness assessments that are provided during that quarter--

“(1) To any council, committee, or other body of the Dept of Defense--

“a That has responsibility for readiness oversight; and

“b Whose membership includes at least one civilian officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the level of Assistant Secretary of Defense or higher;

“(2) By senior civilian and military officers of the military departments and the commanders of the unified and specified commands; and

“(3) As part of any regularly established process of periodic readiness reviews for the Department of Defense as a whole.

“(d) Comprehensive Readiness Indicators for Active Components.--Each report shall also include information regarding each of the Active Components of the Armed Forces (and an evaluation of such information) with respect to readiness indicators in the areas of personnel, training, and

logistics as laid out in the implementation plan submitted by the Secretary of Defense in February 1998.

“(e) Unit Readiness Indicators--Each report shall also include information regarding the readiness of each Active Component unit of the Armed Forces at the battalion, squadron, or an equivalent level (or a higher level) that received a readiness rating of C-3 (or below) for any month of the calendar-year quarter covered by the report. With respect to each such unit, the report shall separately provide the following information:

“(1) The unit designation and level of organization.

“(2) The overall readiness rating for the unit for the quarter and each month of the quarter.

“(3) The resource area or areas (personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, or training) that adversely affected the unit's readiness rating for the quarter.

“(4) The reasons why the unit received a rating of C-3 (or below).

“(f) Classification of Reports--A report under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form. To the extent the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) determines necessary, the report may also be submitted in classified form.”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides a review of current Service and joint military readiness during the third quarter of calendar year 1998 (CY 98/3). In addition, it addresses the readiness of the Armed Forces to conduct operations within a notional scenario unique to this quarter. It also includes special sections on Tempo, Recruiting and Retention, Year 2000 (Y2K) readiness assessments reported by the Services, as well as the initial reporting of expanded readiness indicators directed by Congress.

This quarter's readiness scenario started with current ongoing operations in all Areas of Responsibility (AORs), including the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, then incorporated an outbreak of major theater warfare in Korea. The Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) found that for this scenario, major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings.

A review of overall force readiness indicates that forward deployed and "first-to-fight" forces remain capable of executing the National Military Strategy of fighting two overlapping Major Theater Wars (MTWs). In general, overall unit readiness is satisfactory, although declines in readiness indicators in some segments of the force are a concern. In particular, the readiness of forces for the most stressing case (the 2nd MTW in a two MTW scenario) and our non-deployed forces is eroding. This is reflected in declining unit readiness ratings, mission capable rates, and equipment readiness resulting from aging equipment and parts shortages. It is also a result of manning and experience gaps resulting from recruiting and retention shortfalls. While the readiness decline is most visible in later deploying and non-deploying forces, some forward deployed and "first to fight" forces are also showing downward trends that require attention. Unit readiness trends are discussed in detail in Classified Annex A.

The assessment also highlighted the "joint readiness" concerns of the commanders in chief (CINCs) regarding their ability to effectively synchronize and use forces to meet theater and national objectives. The assessment re-emphasized seven previously identified areas of strategic concern and identified a new eighth concern. These concerns include the ability to quickly disengage from ongoing contingency operations, mobility shortfalls, logistics/sustainment shortfalls, C4 and ISR deficiencies, terrorist and WMD challenges, and the new strategic concern of information vulnerabilities. Of the identified readiness deficiencies, approximately 70 percent are "capability" related, reflecting a lack of resources to meet established mission requirements, while 30 percent are "readiness" deficiencies that reflect a degradation in ability due to shortfalls in equipment condition or training. See Classified Annex A for more details of these concerns.

The Department of Defense continues to face a growing challenge in balancing the competing demands of maintaining current readiness while supporting a costly infrastructure and ensuring our future readiness through acquiring sufficient numbers of modern weapon systems and equipment. To buttress our current readiness posture, Congress recently approved an increase to FY 1999 readiness accounts of over \$1 billion. This increase will be used to alleviate shortfalls in spare parts, depot maintenance, and recruiting, as well as numerous other readiness concerns. We are also working closely with our military Services and the Office of Management and Budget to address all the critical current and future readiness issues in the FY 2000 budget.

We continue to improve our ability to assess and report on the readiness of the US armed forces. Both the JMRR and the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) reviews continue to improve in assessing and reporting readiness data. For example, new readiness data in this report includes Service data briefed to the SROC on the status of Y2K readiness programs, assuring senior leadership that we are effectively preparing for that event. Lastly, we have also included the trend data on readiness indicators as presented in DOD's Implementation Plan prepared for Sec 482 of title 10 as directed in the 1998 Defense Authorization Act (See Annex B).

Other Trends This Quarter

- Recruitment and retention are becoming more difficult and costly due to continuation of robust economy, high tempo, and pay and benefit concerns.
- High tempo in all Services, especially Air Force and Army, remains a significant concern, although steps to monitor and manage tempo have been taken.
- Marine Corps retains high current readiness, but at the expense of investment in future readiness through modernization.
- Earlier "targeted" funding in FY 98 budget is having some positive effect in critical areas such as engine maintenance and repair.

I. THE CY 98/3 READINESS REVIEW


This section summarizes readiness to meet the scenario during the period July through September 1998, as well as unit and joint readiness during the same period and forecast for the next 12 months.

Readiness to Meet a Specific Scenario

Scenario for the Third Quarter in Calendar Year 1998 (CY 98/3):

This quarter's scenario reflects the cumulative impact of ongoing operations (including SFOR), and a major theater war in Korea.

CY98/3 Scenario



Scenario assumptions included:

- Real world requirements as of 15 June 1998.
- NCA declares a national emergency on C-day.
- JSCP and OPLAN planning timelines used.

C-DAY = MOVEMENT FROM POINT OF
ORIGIN BEGINS

Scenario Unit Assessment: For this quarter's scenario, most major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned missions. However, the pace of contingency operations continues to stress the readiness of certain segments of the force. Lower unit readiness, due to key personnel shortages, such as mechanics and pilots, and shortages of spare parts for our equipment, is a significant and growing concern.

Scenario Joint Assessment: While our forces remain capable of executing the 2 MTW strategy, mobility shortfalls continue to impact MTW closure. In addition, logistics shortfalls, C4 and ISR deficiencies, and terrorist and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) challenges add to MTW risk and are strategic concerns. Continuous monitoring of LD/HD (low density, high demand; i.e. units small in number but frequently deployed) assets in compliance with the Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) enables us to get the most efficient use from these specialized forces while controlling their tempo.

Unit Readiness

Current Unit Readiness: Forward deployed and “first-to-fight” unit readiness maintains the capability to execute the National Military Strategy. However, we are experiencing declines in several readiness indicators. The Army’s personnel strength, the Navy’s officer retention rates and surface ship enlisted personnel strength, and the Air Force’s rated officer strength are experiencing shortfalls due to recruiting and retention problems. Shortages of personnel and ongoing contingency operations have lead to training deficiencies in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and USSOCOM. The Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and USSOCOM are experiencing equipment readiness problems resulting from aging equipment and parts shortages. We continue to closely monitor LD/HD assets (e.g., AWACS, U-2, EA-6B, and special operations forces).









Unit Readiness Trends: Each Service table in the following series displays current and forecast unit readiness levels. Across the Services, current readiness indicators show areas of concern. Most are not projected to improve within the next 12 months. In the following tables, four components of current unit readiness--personnel, equipment, training, and enablers--are reported by each Service and USSOCOM as **green for good**, **yellow for concern**, and **red for unsatisfactory**. Although there are slight differences between the Services in what are considered enablers, in general they are critical units or capabilities essential to support joint operations (e.g., critical combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units, supplies, etc.). Projected trends are shown with arrows. An upward arrow indicates an ongoing or projected improvement, a horizontal arrow indicates stability (conditions are getting neither better nor worse), and a downward arrow depicts ongoing or projected deterioration.

Readiness Trends by Service

ARMY

Current +12 mo

Comments









PERSONNEL			ARMY PERSONNEL READINESS CHALLENGES INCLUDE: MATCHING FORCE STRUCTURE TO END STRENGTH AND INVENTORY, MEETING GOALS IN AN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT RECRUITING ENVIRONMENT, SUSTAINING RETENTION SUCCESS, EXECUTING MORE MISSIONS WITH A SMALLER BASE, REDUCING UNCERTAINTY, AND IMPROVING QUALITY OF LIFE.
EQUIPMENT			REMAINS STRONG OVERALL - CONCERNED ABOUT AGING EQUIPMENT. SOLDIERS ARE WORKING HARDER TO MAINTAIN.
TRAINING			PERSONNEL SHORTAGES IMPACTING TRAINING READINESS RATES. OPTEMPO FUND MIGRATION RESTRICTING BATTALION-LEVEL AND ABOVE TRAINING. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IMPACT ON COLLECTIVE UNIT READINESS FOR DEPLOYED UNITS. CROSS-LEVELING TO MEET DEPLOYMENT STANDARDS HAS A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON UNITS LEFT BEHIND.
ENABLERS			FILL OF PRE-POSITION SETS CONTINUES TO PROGRESS, AND ONGOING DELIVERY OF LMSRs IS GREATLY IMPROVING THE PREPO AFLOAT CAPABILITY. 91 PERCENT OF PRE-POSITIONED MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN PLACE. WORKING AWRSI ISSUE.

The Army is seeing a reduced ability to train and sustain the force as current operations continue at a high pace. It has become more costly to recruit and retain quality personnel. Training, modernization, base operations, and real property maintenance all suffer from a shortage of funds.

NAVY

Current +12 mo





Comments

PERSONNEL			RETIREMENT AND PAY GAP CONCERNS. 25 PERCENT REDUCTION IN INSPECTIONS AND ASSIST VISITS TO REDUCE PERSTEMPO.
EQUIPMENT			IMPACT OF NON-FLYABLE NON-DEPLOYED AIRCRAFT DUE TO ENGINE SHORTFALLS. RECOVERY EXPECTED BY END OF FY99.
TRAINING			IMPACT OF NON-FLYABLE NON-DEPLOYED AIRCRAFT DUE TO ENGINES. LONGER RECOVERY EXPECTED.
ENABLERS			TEMPO CONCERNS.

Navy readiness remains lower in the personnel resource area due to recruiting and retention shortfalls. We project there will be a significant shortfall of mid-grade officers (aviation, surface, subsurface and special warfare) unless retention improves. The Navy has increased recruiting resources, but pay and retirement benefits are the major issues contributing to current and future shortfalls.









The material condition of deployed aircraft has improved somewhat in FY 1998. However, the improvement appears to be at the expense of non-deployed aircraft (currently below the desired level). The Navy has applied funding to help this area but it will take time to correct. Due to recent engine reliability developments, we expect non-deployed material condition to decline for a substantial portion of FY 1999. This will also degrade non-deployed training. While we expect to resolve the engine issue and recover by the end of the fiscal year, training will take a bit more time.

PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO guidelines have been increasingly stressed. The effect is magnified on our low density/high demand units. Some of these assets, for example the EA-6B squadrons, are being driven harder and, therefore, we have concerns over our ability to retain these sailors. The Navy is projecting this decline in retention to continue through next year.

MARINE CORPS		Current +12 mo	Comments
PERSONNEL		➔	INFANTRY BATTALION UNIT COHESION PROGRAM PRODUCING RESULTS
EQUIPMENT		➔	GROUND EQUIPMENT READINESS REMAINS HIGH. AGE INCREASING MAINTENANCE HOURS; PARTS COSTS CONTINUE TO RISE
TRAINING		➔	AVIATION: NEW AIRCREW TRAINING GROUND: ON TRACK WITH CYCLES
ENABLERS		➔	MPSRON-3: SHIPS ROTATING THROUGH MAINTENANCE CYCLE MV WILLIAMS AT BLOUNT ISLAND, FL

While current readiness is not a major problem for the Marine Corps, maintaining this readiness is becoming increasingly expensive and comes at the expense of modernization, base infrastructure, and quality of life accounts. These tradeoffs make procurement of modern weapon systems the most critical readiness challenge for the Marine Corps. Likewise, funding shortfalls in base infrastructure accounts have caused the facility replacement cycle to now approach 200 years, and the backlog of facility maintenance to increase to \$1 billion by FY 2003.

AIR FORCE **Current +12 mo** **Comments**

PERSONNEL			Overall Officer and 2nd term enlisted retention trend is a concern. The pilot retention trend is unsatisfactory. High tempo continues to affect quality of life in many specialties. AF is taking steps--working with joint commanders to reduce short-notice deployments; SWA flying unit deployments now 45 days; Unit stand downs after long deployments; reduced unit inspections and competitions; increased pilot training output. Recent SWA drawdown may provide some relief down the road.
EQUIPMENT			Continued use of "bare base" assets for ongoing operations severely impacts availability for MTW. Mission capable rates are down but beginning to stabilize. Spare engine levels are improving but still below requirements for several units/aircraft types. AF is aggressively engaging engine and other equipment shortfalls with increased inspections and spares funding.
TRAINING			Units are experiencing training deficiencies caused by deployments to Southwest Asia. SWA drawdown will help improve this situation once redeploying units are able to accomplish normal training.
ENABLERS			High demand for LD/HD assets requires careful tempo management to sustain readiness. GMFP allows for surges in LD/HD assets, but only for a limited time. In the past, some assets exceeded that time. Today all systems are at or below steady state GMFP deployment limits. However, we are carefully reviewing previous assumptions for steady state deployment levels; they may have been optimistic. We may also include other assets under the GMFP umbrella.

Air Force front-line units' readiness and capability is high (Bosnia, SWA, Korea), but the Air Force is concerned with declining readiness over the entire force. Leadership and management are working hard to reverse the trend. Tempo remains the biggest concern. Combat aircraft systems receiving specific management attention due to high Tempo have gone from 4 to 22 since FY 1996. The Air Force Reserve Components are volunteering at significantly high levels and sharing a significant part of the load.

Budget constraints are driving competition for resources among readiness, modernization, and Quality of Life (QOL) accounts. The Air Force has also noted frustration levels growing in the field and the idea of "working harder and smarter" is not fixing the problem.

Retention is directly affected by tempo and related issues. Surveys indicate Air Force personnel are being pushed out by high tempo, lack of on the job resources, compensation, perceptions about benefits, and family QOL. In addition, people are pulled out by good civilian jobs with better pay and benefits in a robust economy. Specific retention data includes:

-- Pilots - retention rate: down 41 percent, FY 1995 to FY 1998/3









-- Bonus takers (Aviation Continuation Pay): take rate down 55 percent, FY 1994 to FY 1998

-- FY 1998 long-term bonus-accept rate, as of 30 September 1998, is currently 26 percent

-- Airline hiring - demand exceeds eligible military pilots through at least 2003

-- Enlisted second term retention - 69 percent for FY 1998 (as of 31 August 1998), below AF goal of 75 percent; down 13 percent since FY 1993 (82%), resulting in a loss of NCO experience and leadership.

The Air Force has many positive initiatives to improve readiness. Weapon system spares funding has been stabilized by targeting funding to critical areas such as engines. Tempo has been eased by reducing the number of personnel deployed to Southwest Asia; cuts in exercises, competitions, and inspections; spreading taskings (global sourcing); increasing crew ratios or aircraft for problem systems (HC-130, RC-135); standing down after deployments; increasing pilot production; and not filling staff positions to support line units. Retention initiatives include increasing compensation for both pilots and critical enlisted skills. The Air Force is also addressing QOL issues through increased funding for childcare, family housing and dormitories, and improving care for families of deployed personnel. QOL investments are seen as total force retention initiatives. Senior Air Force leaders are continuing to look for additional initiatives to improve readiness and supportability of our force.

SOCOM	Current	+12 mo	Comments
PERSONNEL			AFSOC: Shortage of critical specialties. Projected to rise by October 1998. USASOC: Shortage of RC Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) and Civil Affairs (CA) personnel. PSYOPs reserve will remain below requirements for the next 12 months.
EQUIPMENT			AFSOC: Short of readiness spares package (RSP) for MC-130E/H/P and MH-53. USASOC: Fielding of new loudspeakers pending in PSYOPs (RC).
TRAINING			AFSOC: Shortage of trained Intel personnel to support SOF aviation mission. NAVSPECWARCOM: Lack specified training for Intel personnel.
ENABLERS (AT/FP)			Shortage of NBC personnel protection and detection equipment. Lack of deployable point/perimeter detection systems. Improving over the next 12 months with regional CINC/SOCs identifying mission equipment requirements.


Tempo

Minimizing the strain of high tempo is important to us, as the effects often wear most heavily on our most critical resource, our people. Traditionally, the Navy and Marine Corps have had high tempo rates and are structured accordingly--having few tempo-related issues, although there are exceptions. Some elements of the Army have experienced a relatively high tempo over the past several years, continuing in this quarter as a

result of ongoing overseas commitments (e.g., SFOR). This tempo problem is exacerbated by training requirements on both ends of a 180-day unit deployment. The highest tempo challenges are within the Air Force, which are a result of a high number of sustained overseas commitments coupled with force downsizing, has had the most dramatic rise in tempo of all the Services. Appendix AT details the tempo management process and latest reporting data for each of the Services.

Recruiting and Retention

All the Services are facing challenges in recruiting and retention. A robust US economy and a sustained high OPTEMPO drive these challenges. Record low unemployment and a growing economy have resulted in a lower propensity for young people to enlist in the military. Those same factors, combined with quality of life issues, are leading larger than normal numbers of personnel to leave the military for civilian jobs, especially in the aviation and technical skills areas.



Despite these challenges, the Services have generally been maintaining their overall personnel strength, albeit with increased costs in the areas of advertising, numbers of recruiters, and bonuses, except in some selected skills. However, except for the Marine Corps, the Services have recently begun to experience a decline in personnel readiness levels despite their increased efforts to recruit and retain personnel.

The Navy is below its FY 1998 recruiting goals, projecting an accession shortfall of 7000 personnel. While the Army and Air Force have managed to meet their FY 1998 recruiting goals, it has been accomplished at the expense of the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) and with concern for the quality of today's initial entry recruits. They are taking aggressive steps to address the shortfalls, such as increasing the number of recruiters, increasing advertising funding, and enhancing enlistment incentive programs. Although the average cost to recruit one person into the military

has doubled, the decline in recruiting trends has not been arrested. The Marine Corps is also concerned about future recruiting prospects driven by reduced propensity to enlist, the strong economy, historically low levels of unemployment, and the cost of advertising.

In addition to recruiting problems, the Services' overall retention rates have also shown a serious decline during the past quarter. Retention rates for all the Services except the Marine Corps are below the levels required to maintain end strength and readiness goals. The Army is experiencing shortages of key leadership personnel to include captains, majors, and NCOs, as well as shortages in critical skills to support the warfight, such as Apache helicopter pilots, mechanics, and medical and intelligence specialists. The Navy is over 14,000 personnel short in at-sea manning, mostly in junior pay grades. The Air Force is projecting a shortage of pilots, including the Guard and Reserve, of over 3200 by FY 2002. These shortages are now showing up as decreases in unit readiness levels. While the primary means of combating these retention challenges have included reviewing and retargeting reenlistment incentive bonus programs, taking steps to improve advancement opportunities, and continuing initiatives to address QOL issues, additional measures will have to be taken to stem the flow of personnel out of the military.

Personnel readiness trends can be seen in the classified section of this report as part of the expanded readiness indicators.

YEAR 2000 (Y2K) Status

This quarter, the SROC addressed Y2K implications on readiness. The focus was on the readiness implications of Y2K on weapons systems, and the potential impact on the military's warfighting capability. The Services and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) all reported their Y2K processes were on schedule, their systems and interfaces testing and certification for Y2K compliance was near completion, and that they were ready to execute an extensive joint exercise and evaluation schedule during FY 1999. None of the Services expects to encounter any serious Y2K impacts on mission capability, especially in mission critical (MC) systems. Contingency plans are ready to manage any impacts identified during the final phases of testing.

DOD has had a Y2K review process underway since 1996. That process includes six phases that involve:

Phase 1. Awareness: in which personnel were educated, systems inventoried, mission critical systems identified, and strategies developed. (Completed December 1996)

Phase 2. Assessment: systems analyzed for Y2K compliance, prioritized for renovation, entered in a tracking database, and electronic interfaces defined. (Completed June 1997)

Phase 3. Renovations: repairs were implemented, interface changes coordinated, and risk analysis and contingency plans developed. (Completed June 1998 for MC systems and September 1998 for non-mission critical (NMC) systems)

Phase 4. Validation: unit, integration and system testing; acceptance testing and certification; return to renovation phase, if needed; and contingency plans updated. (Completed September 1998 for MC and to be completed January 1999 for NMC)

Phase 5. Implementation: final risk analyses and firm contingency strategies completed, tests completed, all interfaces Y2K compliant, Y2K fixes fully promulgated, systems successfully integrated and operational. (To be completed December 1998 for MC and March 1999 for NMC)

Phase 6. Operational Evaluation: evaluation of military forces to accomplish CINC missions and selected CINC tasks, full integration of "systems of systems," capture of lessons learned, execution of contingency plans, if necessary. (To be completed December 1999)

Joint Readiness Strategic Concerns

How Strategic Concerns are Derived: The process is initiated with deficiency reports provided by the CINCs during the JMRR process. We presently have 118 deficiencies (30 percent readiness deficiencies reflecting degradation of ability due to poor condition or lack of training, and 70 percent capabilities deficiencies reflecting a lack of resources to meet established mission requirements) that are being worked or monitored. These CINC-reported deficiencies are then grouped into "elements of concern," or tactical-level groupings of related items. These "elements of concern" are then categorized into strategic-level groupings that represent overriding readiness issues or strategic concerns. (See an explanation of this process and our new prioritization process in the Classified Annex) Service deficiencies also feed into these strategic groupings and, generally, have a longer-term focus than CINC-identified deficiencies.

Current Joint Readiness: Although overall unit readiness indicates our Armed Forces remain capable of executing the National Military Strategy, there are eight areas of strategic concern for joint readiness, including a new one identified this quarter. The areas are: ongoing contingency operations, ability to quickly disengage from ongoing operations, mobility shortfalls, logistics/sustainment shortfalls, C4 and ISR deficiencies, terrorist and WMD challenges, and the new strategic concern of information

vulnerabilities. These strategic concerns are discussed in the Classified Annex.

Readiness to Execute the Full Range of the National Military Strategy

A classified risk assessment is included in the Classified Annex A to this report.

II. SUMMARY

This quarter's readiness scenario started with current operations in all AORs (including SFOR) followed by a major theater war in Korea. Most major combat and key support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings for that scenario. A review of overall force readiness confirms that America's Armed Forces remain capable of executing the National Military Strategy. Overall unit readiness is satisfactory in most cases, although continuing declines in readiness indicators are a concern. The Services have already taken active measures to address these issues, but concerns about personnel shortages and aging equipment require more attention and resources. The Services continue to face a growing challenge in their struggle to balance resources to meet the competing demands of personnel, current readiness, infrastructure, and modernization. Although readiness has been given priority at the expense of other areas, it continues a gradual decline while the other areas are still underfunded. Keeping our current readiness posture sharp while preparing for tomorrow's challenges will require increased attention and resources. The Classified Annex provides a comprehensive readiness risk assessment.

GLOSSARY

The following is a list of acronyms and abbreviations that are used within the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress

AC	Active component
ACOM	Atlantic Command
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
ALFT	airlift
AOR	area of responsibility
ARC	Air Reserve Components
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
ARL	Airborne Reconnaissance Low
AWRSI	Army war reserve secondary item
BDE	brigade
C-Day	force movement begins
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CENTCOM	Central Command
CFC	Combined Forces Command
CINC	commander in chief of a unified command
COMM	communications
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSA	Combat Support Agency
CVBG	carrier battle group
D-Day	operations begin
DEPSECDEF	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DEPTempo	deployment tempo
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DSCS	defense satellite communications system
EOH	equipment on hand
EUCOM	European Command
FY	fiscal year
FYDP	future years defense program
GMFP	Global Military Force Policy
GSORTS	Global Status of Resources and Training System
I-Day	intelligence indicators are recognized
IFOR	implementation force
ISR	intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance
JMCIS	Joint Maritime Command Information System
JMRR	Joint Monthly Readiness Review
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
LD/HD	low density, high demand
MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence

MEU(SOC)	Marine expeditionary unit, special operations capable
MHE	materiel handling equipment
MILSATCOM	military satellite communications
MPA	manpower authorization
MPSRON	Maritime pre-positioned ship squadron
MTW	major theater war
MV	motorized vessel
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, chemical
NCO	non-commissioned officer
NEO	non-combatant evacuation operations
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NMS	National Military Strategy
OOTW	operations other than war
Ops	operations
OPTEMPO	operations tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACOM	Pacific Command
PERSTEMPO	personnel tempo
POL	petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POM	program objective memorandum
PREPO	prepositioned equipment
PSRC	Presidential Selective Reserve Callup
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
QRRC	Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress
RC	reserve component
RECCE	reconnaissance
SATCOM	satellite communications
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SETAF	Southern European Task Force
SFOR	stabilization force
SIOP	Single Integrated Operations Plan
SOF	special operations forces
SORTS	Status of Resources and Training System
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
SROC	Senior Readiness Oversight Council
SSC	small scale contingency
SWA	southwest Asia
TAA	Total Army Assessment
THREATCON	threat condition level of normal, alpha, bravo, charlie, or delta
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UHF	ultra-high frequency
USFK	United States Forces Korea
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction


I. THE READINESS ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Traditionally, the Department of Defense viewed readiness from a unit perspective--readiness of individual units of the Military Services to do their designed missions. Today, the Nation's global strategy calls for a readiness perspective that encompasses more than an aggregation of individual unit readiness. In the fall of 1994, the Department of Defense established a process to assess readiness across geographic regions vital to national interests.

This new view of readiness required a joint perspective. In addition to the readiness issues of the four Services, the readiness of the unified commands and the DOD CSA is key. Joint readiness focuses on the ability of the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified commands plus the Combined Forces Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command to use forces provided from the Services and assets from five CSAs in accomplishing theater and national objectives. Joint readiness is assessed in eight functional areas:

- **Mobility**
- **Logistics/Sustainment**
- **Infrastructure**
- **Joint Personnel**
- **Communications**
- **Special Operations**
- **Joint Headquarters**
- **Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR)**

In other words, these functional areas are critical to each CINC's task of integrating and synchronizing individual units into an effective joint team. They enable the CINC to most effectively use the forces he is provided. With worldwide interests and challenges, the United States must be able to engage in virtually every region of the globe and maintain the capability to deal with more than one major contingency at a time. Readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy depends on maintaining high states of unit and joint readiness.



The central component of the DOD readiness assessment process is the **JMRR**. This review incorporates inputs from the Services, CINCs, and CSAs. Five CSAs--Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the National Security Agency--make unique and critical contributions to combat readiness and operations. The JMRR provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a current and broad assessment of the military's readiness to execute the full range of the national military strategy, including peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and winning the Nation's wars.

Reports provide assessments of current readiness and projected readiness over the next 12 months. In addition, the Joint Staff specifies a warfighting scenario each quarter to ensure a robust assessment of the military's most demanding missions.

National Military Strategy Criteria

Assessment

Shape Strategic Environment

Prepare for Uncertain Future

Full Spectrum Crisis Response

Current requirements/missions

Forecast requirements/missions over next 12 months

Warfighting Scenario

The JMRR is conducted on a 3-month cycle:

Full JMRR	Oct	Jan	Apr	Jul
By Exception	Nov	Feb	May	Aug
By Exception and Feedback	Dec	Mar	Jun	Sep
Deficiency Review		Feb		Aug

The “**Full JMRR**,” the most extensive review, is conducted in October, January, April, and July. During JMRR meetings, the Services report on major combat units and critical support capabilities. Service reports show (1) the status of unit resources and training, (2) which units are engaged in ongoing operations, and (3) which units would engage in the warfighting scenario. In addition, each Service reports trends for the key components of unit readiness--people, equipment, training, and enablers.

Unified commands and CSAs report on each relevant joint functional area as listed earlier. The reports assess the readiness of these key components of the US military structure to meet current, projected, and scenario requirements.

By integrating the Service, unified command, and CSA reports, we reach an overall picture of current readiness. It is important to note that some elements of these assessments are, by nature, subjective. The key element of any readiness assessment must always be the commander’s judgment. However, because objective information is required to fix readiness problems, the process requires a detailed explanation of reported concerns.

During the second month of the cycle, the staffs work issues reported in the full JMRR. To maintain a monthly focus, a “**By-Exception**” JMRR report is submitted during the second month if required or directed. This report highlights significant readiness changes that may have occurred since the “full JMRR.”


The “**Feedback**” JMRR is conducted in the third month of the cycle, in conjunction with a “By-Exception” JMRR. During the “feedback” JMRR, the Joint Staff directors address actions that have taken place in their respective functional areas to remedy CINC and CSA issues.

The **Deficiency Reviews** are a recent addition to the process, used to focus attention on the most important issues. CINCs revalidate and prioritize each of their reported deficiencies and the Joint Staff reviews every deficiency for warfighting importance and working status.

Issues are categorized in two ways. Readiness issues reflect an inability of existing forces to fully perform their functions. Capability issues at the theater or national level reflect shortfalls driven by the strategy. Each concern is addressed. In some cases, a near-term fix is identified and implemented. In other cases, the solution is best addressed through programmatic action. In some cases, the only option available is to just recognize that there is a problem and accept the resulting risk.

It is important to note that the JMRR process focuses on identifying near-term readiness issues (within the next 2-year period) and on finding and implementing solutions. For longer-term readiness issues, the Joint Staff analyzes future capability requirements through the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process. This report and subsequent quarterly readiness reports will address only near-term readiness issues and fixes. Near-term readiness is the focus of the readiness system established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To provide civilian oversight, significant issues raised through the JMRR process are used to make a monthly risk assessment that is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The SROC brings the Service Chiefs, Under Secretaries of Defense, Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff together for a monthly forum to review current readiness. At each meeting of the SROC, the Service Chiefs provide a current and forecast assessment of their respective units. A Joint Readiness assessment is provided by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, the Vice Chairman presents an overall assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the full range of the national military strategy. The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) is based on assessments provided to the SROC.




II. TEMPO

In recognition of the need to more closely monitor tempo (the pace of peacetime operations) across the force the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services and USSOCOM, has initiated a tempo management process. We have worked closely with the Services and CINCs to increase understanding of tempo issues, reach consensus on a management approach, and build a comprehensive GMFP-like management process.


Due to the uniqueness of Service equipment, organization, operational concepts and methods of managing tempo, it was necessary to use Service specific measurement categories, metrics, and thresholds.

The first of the following tempo slides depicts the tempo management process we have put in place. The tempo drivers are combined to derive total tempo for each Service. This total tempo is then compared to each Service's executive-level threshold metric, using the template displayed in the second tempo slide, and is briefed in the JMRR and the SROC. Any portions of the force that exceed the threshold are evaluated to determine causes, assess impact to the force, and determine possible near-term means of alleviating tempo. Long-term solutions are later considered for implementation and become future input to the process.



Tempo Metrics

- *Services used this template to assess tempo*
 - Service-specific segments of the force identified
 - Tempo metrics / goals included on slide
 - Segments of the force which do not meet goals become candidates for FB JMRR and SROC




Army Tempo: The Army measures DepTempo by monitoring the amount of time soldiers/units spend away from their bunks for any reason. Fifty-eight of 1462 units are projected to exceed the 180 day per year deployed threshold, largely due to deployments to Bosnia. The Bosnia mission requires units to acquire predeployment training before entering the arena. Upon completing their 180-day mission, units are then required to obtain additional training in preparing to meet their war time mission requirements.

ARMY DEPTempo (OCT 97 - SEP 98)		
UNITS EXCEEDING OR PROJECTED TO EXCEED DEPTempo GREATER THAN 120 DAYS PER YEAR		167
UNITS EXCEEDING OR PROJECTED TO EXCEED DEPTempo GREATER THAN 180 DAYS PER YEAR		58
THERE ARE 1,462 "AA" REPORTING UNITS		


ARMY HIGH DEPTempo PROFILE (OCT 97 - SEP 98)				
	LOCAL TRAINING	OFF-POST TRAINING	JOINT EXERCISES	CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
				21
21 UNITS EXCEEDING, 37 UNITS PROJECTED TO EXCEED 180 DAYS DEPTempo PER YEAR				H/159 AV BN USAREUR (BOSNIA) 1-501 AVN USAREUR (BOSNIA) 41st MED HSP FORSCOM (BOSNIA) 1-327 IN (AASLT) FORSCOM (MFO SINAI) 1-325 IN (ABN) FORSCOM (MFO SINAI) 2-504 IN (ABN) FORSCOM (RIYADH) 2d ACR (6 units) FORSCOM (BOSNIA) HHC, AVN BDE USAREUR (BOSNIA) 1st AR DIV USAREUR (BOSNIA) 272 MVMT CNT CTR FORSCOM (BOSNIA) 43 MP DET FORSCOM (BOSNIA) 2-6 IN BN USAREUR (BOSNIA) HHC, 1st AR DIV USAREUR (BOSNIA) 385 SIG CO FORSCOM (BOSNIA) 501 MI BN USAREUR (BOSNIA) D/158 AV BN USAREUR (BOSNIA)

Navy Tempo: The Navy uses a combination metric to measure tempo. PersTempo is measured by determining the amount of time ships are deployed out of home port each year and then managing those deployments over a 3-year period (the normal Navy tour length). Units are expected to spend twice as long non-deployed as deployed (turn-around-ratio), at least 50 percent of their time in home port over a five year cycle, and not to be deployed more than 6 months at a time. Less than 1 percent of deployable units and 0.1 percent of active duty manpower exceed those thresholds.




Navy Readiness - July 1998

Units not meeting Navy PERSTEMPO goals represent a small percentage of deployable units and Active Duty manpower.



Marine Corps Tempo: The Marine Corps measures DepTempo by counting the days each unit is deployed for 10 consecutive days or more away from home station. The Marines have a desired goal of no more than 180 days deployed per year per unit when looked at over a 36-month scheduling period. The period covered by the charts below details this process. The first chart displays the percentage of measured units that met the goal over the preceding 12 months. The second displays the actual numbers of units that did not meet the goal. These units conducted pre-deployment training and then deployed. As Marine Corps deployments are scheduled for 180 days, this coupled with pre-deployment training will naturally have units not meeting the goal. The impact of this past DepTempo is considered when scheduling for the forthcoming 24 months. Commanders ensure DepTempo control and balance by adjusting unit schedules as necessary. This allows a minimum of 12 months back and a minimum 2:1 turnaround time between deployments, although a 3:1 ratio is the desired goal.



BN - Battalion
INF - Infantry


ARTY - Artillery
VMFA - Aviation Sqdn

CVW - Carrier Air Wing
UDP - Land-based Air Wg


HMH - Heavy Helo
HMM - Medium Helo
HMLA - Light Attack Helo

Air Force TEMPO

Air Force Tempo
1 Jun 97 - 31 May 98
AIR FORCE DESIRED MAXIMUM
120 DAYS OR LESS TDY IN 12 MONTHS



**DEPTempo From 3rd QTR CY 97 Thru 2nd QTR CY00
PERCENTAGE OF UNITS MEETING 180 DAY GOAL**




BN - Battalion
INF - Infantry

ARTY - Artillery
VMFA - Aviation Sqdn


CVW - Carrier Air Wing
UDP - Land-based Air Wg

HMH - Heavy Helo
HMM - Medium Helo
HMLA - Light Attack Helo

**DEPTempo From 3rd QTR CY97 Thru 2nd QTR CY00
MAJOR DEPLOYING UNITS NOT MEETING GOAL < 180 DAYS**



Air Force Tempo: The Air Force measures tempo by tracking the number of days individuals are away from their home station. They have established a desired maximum of 120 days TDY per year for their personnel. Their graphics show the percentage of personnel in each functional area who exceed the desired maximum and the average total amount of time for the past year that each individual over the maximum was deployed. A number of combat systems and personnel skills exceed the Air Force tempo goal due to the high number of operations they support. The Air Force has several initiatives underway to mitigate the effects of this tempo.




Air Force TEMPO

AIR FORCE DESIRED MAXIMUM
120 DAYS OR LESS TDY IN 12 MONTHS

1 Jun 97 - 31 May 98

Combat Systems - 43 Evaluated, 22 Receiving management attention

% over 120 days XXX Avg # days for those > 120 days % over 90 days * GMFP Asset




Air Force TEMPO

Air Force Tempo
1 Jun 97 - 31 May 98
AIR FORCE DESIRED MAXIMUM
120 DAYS OR LESS TDY IN 12 MONTHS

Skills - 730 Evaluated, 31 Receiving management attention

%over 120 days XXX Avg. # days for those >120 %over 90 days (Manning) * Combined AFSCs



C-LEVEL REASON CODES

For use with appendices

CODE	DEFINITION
P01	CASUALTIES
P02	INSUFFICIENT FUNDING
P03	MOS IMBALANCES
P04	NOT MOS QUALIFIED
P05	ORGANIZATION ACTIVATING
P06	ORGANIZATION DECOMMISSIONING/DEACTIVATING
P07	ORGANIZATION IN ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT
P08	ORGANIZATION RECENTLY ACTIVATED/REORGANIZED
P09	PERSONNEL LEVIES EXCESSIVE
P10	PERSONNEL NOT CATEGORY 1/NOT AVAILABLE
P11	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE
P12	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--AIR DEFENSE MOS
P13	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--ARMOR MOS
P14	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--ARTILLERY MOS
P15	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--COMBAT CREWS
P16	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--CREW SHIP
P17	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--DEPLOYABLE PERSONNEL
P18	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--ENGINEER MOS
P19	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--ENLISTED
P20	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--ENLISTED COMBAT CREWS
P21	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--GROUND OFFICER
P22	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--INFANTRY MOS
P23	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--INSTRUCTOR
P24	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--INSTRUCTOR AIR CREW
P25	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--LOAD CREW
P26	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--MAINTENANCE
P27	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--NAVIGATOR/OBSERVER
P28	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--NCO(E-4 TO E-5)
P29	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--NCO/PETTY OFFICER(E-6 TO E-9)
P30	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--NCO SENIOR(E-7 TO E-9)
P31	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--NCO STAFF(E-6 TO E-9)
P32	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--OFFICER
P33	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--OFFICER NAVAL FLIGHT
P34	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--O-1 TO O-3
P35	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--O-4 TO O-6
P36	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--PILOT
P37	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--QUALIFIED TO PERFORM MOS/NEC/AFSC DUTIES WHICH ASSIGNED
P38	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--SIGNAL MOS
P39	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--WARRANT OFFICER
P40	SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATION DETACHED
P41	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--FUEL SHORTAGE
P42	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--VEHICLE MAINTENANCE
P43	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE
P44	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--AVIONICS SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE
P45	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS MAINTENANCE
P46	PROGRAM CHANGE
P47	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--SECURITY POLICE
P48	SKILL SHORTAGE--WEAPON SYSTEM CONVERSION
P49	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--AERIAL PORT
P50	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--FIREFIGHTERS
P51	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--CIVIL ENGINEERING
P52	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--MEDICAL
P53	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--CIVILIAN
P54	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--ENLISTED AIRCREW
P55	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--WEAPON SYSTEM OFFICER

C-LEVEL REASON CODES

For use with appendices

P56	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER
P57	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--LOADMASTER
P58	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--CONTROLLERS
P59	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--MISSILE MAINTENANCE
P60	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
P61	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--COMPUTER OPERATOR
P62	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--MUNITIONS SUPPORT
P63	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--FUELS SUPPORT
P64	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--LINGUISTICS
P65	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--SERVICE CONSTRAINT(LOWW ALO TYPE B OR CADRE)
P66	PERSONNEL NOT AVAILABLE--DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE
P67	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--MEDICAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
P68	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--MEDICAL SERVICE SKILLS
P69	PERSONNEL LACK SECURITY CLEARANCE
P70	SKILL SHORTAGE--NUCLEAR WEAPONS
P71	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--FULL-TIME MANNING
P72	PERSONNEL TURNOVER--LOSSES TO UNIT
P73	PERSONNEL TURBULENCE--INTERNAL REASSIGNMENTS
P74	UNIT REORGANIZING
P75	ZERO STRENGTH UNIT
P76	PERSONNEL SUPPORTING TRAINING MISSION(SCHOOL SUPPORT)
P77	TRAINING UNIT WITH WARTIME MISSION TASKING CAPABILITY
P78	UNIT NOT MANNED OR EQUIPPED; REQUIRED IN WARTIME STRUCTURE
P79	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE-SUPPLY SUPPORT
P80	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE-SUPPLY AND FUELS SUPPORT
P81	NOT MOS QUALIFIED-AWAITING TRAINING
P82	COHORT TRANSITION
P83	AWAITING COHORT-FILL PACKAGE
P84	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE - FORWARDED TO SERVICE PERSONNEL CENTER FOR ACTION
PCV	UNIT UNDERGOING MAJOR EQUIPMENT CONVERSION, TRANSITION
PNM	AREA NOT MEASURED BY PARENT SERVICE DIRECTION
PNP	UNIT PLACED IN CADRE STATUS BY PARENT SERVICE
PRD	UNIT BEING REACTIVATED(REORGANIZED)
PUP	COMMANDER'S JUDGMENT RAISED OVERALL C-LEVEL
R00	EQUIPMENT CONDITION DEGRADATIONS--FUEL SHORTAGE
R01	AIRCRAFT GROUNDED SAFETY FLIGHT
R02	AIRCRAFT DO NOT MEET MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENT
R03	AIRCRAFT STANDARD DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE
R04	NOT MISSION CAPABLE DEPOT--RAPID AREA MAINTENANCE
R05	NOT MISSION CAPABLE DEPOT--PROGRAMMED DEPOT MAINTENANCE
R06	UNIT RECENTLY ACTIVATED
R07	CONVERSION
R08	NBC EQUIPMENT INOPERABLE OR UNCALIBRATED
R09	DAMAGE--BATTLE/COMBAT
R10	DAMAGE--HULL STRUCTURE
R11	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--AIRCRAFT
R12	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--AIRCRAFT ARRESTING GEAR
R13	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--AIRCRAFT ASSAULTS
R14	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--ASROC/SUBROC BATTERY
R15	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--AUXILIARY MACHINERY
R16	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--BOATS/BOAT STORAGE
R17	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--COUNTERMEASURES(ELECTRICAL/MECHANICAL)
R18	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--ECM
R19	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--ELECTRIC POWER AUXILIARY
R20	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--ELECTRIC POWER PRIMARY
R21	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--EQUIPMENT

C-LEVEL REASON CODES

For use with appendices

R22	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--EQUIPMENT COMMUNICATIONS
R23	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--EQUIPMENT ELECTRIC POWER-GENERATING
R24	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--EQUIPMENT ENGINEERING
R25	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--EQUIPMENT FIRE CONTROL
R26	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--EQUIPMENT FLEET SUPPORT
R27	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--IFF
R28	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--LAUNCHER MISSILE
R29	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--LAUNCHER TORPEDO
R30	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--NUCLEAR REACTOR PLANT/CONTROLS
R31	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--RADAR
R32	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--RADAR FIRE CONTROL
R33	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--RADAR SEARCH
R34	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--SHAFT/PROPELLER/STEERING
R35	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--SYSTEM DATA
R36	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--SYSTEM GUN
R37	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--SYSTEM GUN FIRE CONTROL
R38	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--SYSTEM INTELLIGENCE PROCESSING
R39	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--SYSTEM MISSILE FIRE CONTROL
R40	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--SYSTEM NAVIGATION
R41	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--SYSTEM PROPULSION
R42	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--SYSTEM SONAR
R43	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--SYSTEM TORPEDO FIRE CONTROL
R44	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--TORPEDO/MISSILE
R45	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--VEHICLE(S)
R46	DAMAGED/INOPERATIVE--WEAPON(S)
R47	(RESERVED)
R48	EQUIPMENT INSPECTION/CHECKOUT
R49	EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION
R50	EQUIPMENT NEVER PASSED ACCEPTANCE TRIALS
R51	EQUIPMENT OBSOLETE
R52	EQUIPMENT REMOVAL
R53	UNIT REEQUIPPING
R54	EQUIPMENT SHORTAGE
R55	INSPECT AND REPAIR AS NECESSARY--AIRCRAFT
R56	INSPECTION FAILED
R57	(RESERVED)
R58	INSUFFICIENT FUNDING
R59	INSTALLING FIELD CHANGES/ALTERATIONS/MODIFICATIONS
R60	MAINTENANCE--FACILITIES INADEQUATE
R61	MAINTENANCE--IN PROGRESS EXTENSIVE FIELD
R62	MAINTENANCE--SCHEDULED
R63	MAINTENANCE--UNSCHEDULED
R64	MODIFICATION--AIRCRAFT
R65	NOT MISSION CAPABLE MAINTENANCE--AIRCRAFT FRAME
R66	NOT MISSION CAPABLE MAINTENANCE--AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATIONS
R67	NOT MISSION CAPABLE MAINTENANCE--AIRCRAFT INSTRUMENTS
R68	NOT MISSION CAPABLE MAINTENANCE--AIRCRAFT NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM
R69	NOT MISSION CAPABLE MAINTENANCE--AIRCRAFT UTILITIES
R70	NOT MISSION CAPABLE MAINTENANCE--AIRCRAFT WEAPONS CONTROL
R71	NOT MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY--ABOVE ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE
R72	NOT MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY--AIRCRAFT AIRFRAME
R73	NOT MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY--AIRCRAFT
R74	NOT MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY--AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATIONS
R75	NOT MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY--AIRCRAFT INSTRUMENTS
R76	NOT MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY--AIRCRAFT NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM
R77	NOT MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY--AIRCRAFT UTILITIES

C-LEVEL REASON CODES

For use with appendices

R78	NOT MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY--AIRCRAFT WEAPONS CONTROL
R79	NOT MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY--ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE
R80	ORGANIZATION DECOMMISSIONING/DEACTIVATING
R81	ORGANIZATION IN ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT
R82	OVERHAUL--AIRCRAFT
R83	OVERHAUL--EQUIPMENT
R84	OVERHAUL--WEAPONS
R85	POWER FAILURE
R86	RADAR UNRELIABLE/FLIGHT/GROUND CHECK
R87	REPAIR--ATTACHED ORGANIZATION'S EQUIPMENT
R88	REPAIR--ELECTRIC POWER-GENERATING EQUIPMENT
R89	REPAIR--ELECTRONIC
R90	REPAIR--EQUIPMENT
R91	REPAIR--FIELD MAINTENANCE
R92	REPAIR--LACK OF POWER TOOLS TO PERFORM
R93	REPAIR--ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE
R94	REPAIR--WEAPONS
R95	NBC EQUIPMENT INCOMPLETE OR OBSOLETE
R96	INSPECT AND REPAIR AS NECESSARY--MISSILE
R97	MODIFICATION--MISSILE
R98	NOT MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY--MISSILE
R99	OVERHAUL--MISSILE
RAA	NOT MISSION CAPABLE--MAINTENANCE OR SUPPLY UNSCHEDULED
RAB	NOT MISSION CAPABLE--MAINTENANCE OR SUPPLY SCHEDULED
RAC	NOT MISSION CAPABLE--MAINTENANCE UNSCHEDULED
RAD	NOT MISSION CAPABLE--MAINTENANCE SCHEDULED
RAE	NOT MISSION CAPABLE--SUPPLY
RAF	PARTIAL MISSION CAPABLE--MAINTENANCE OR SUPPLY
RAG	PARTIAL MISSION CAPABLE--MAINTENANCE
RAH	PARTIAL MISSION CAPABLE--SUPPLY
RAL	SHORTAGE SUSPENSION EQUIPMENT
RAN	SHORTAGE AIRCRAFT--LOANED/BAILED
RAP	AIRCRAFT IN STORAGE
RAQ	AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL LOSS
RAR	AIRCRAFT COMBAT LOSS
RAS	AIRCRAFT--UNABLE TO MEET REQUIRED TURNAROUNDS
RAT	NOT MISSION CAPABLE DEPOT--MAJOR MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED
RAU	SHORTAGE AIRCRAFT--DEPLOYED
RAV	SHORTAGE AIRCRAFT--POSSESS VS AUTHORIZED USE
RAW	OPERATING BELOW DESIGNED SPECIFICATIONS
RAX	SHORTAGE SPARE ENGINES
RAY	AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED SEPARATE TASKING
RBA	MAINTENANCE--IN PROGRESS ETIC LESS THAN 24 HOURS
RBB	MAINTENANCE--IN PROGRESS ETIC MORE THAN 24 HOURS
RBC	AWAITING PARTS--ETIC LESS THAN 48 HOURS
RBD	AWAITING PARTS--ETIC MORE THAN 48 HOURS
RBE	UNIT REORGANIZING
RBG	COMBAT ESSENTIAL(PACING)ITEM INOPERATIVE
RBH	NOTIONAL UNIT--NOT EQUIPPED NOT MANNED
RBI	EQUIPMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO SCHOOL SUPPORT(TRAINING)MISSION
RBJ	EQUIPMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO EXTENSIVE FIELD TRAINING
RBJ	EQUIPMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO EXTENSIVE ADMIN/NON-MISSION USE
RBK	EQUIPMENT NOT AVAILABLE DUE TO SERVICE CONSTRAINT-LOW ALO, TYPE B CADRE UNIT
RBL	DAMAGED OR INOPERATIVE FUELS EQUIPMENT
RBM	DAMAGED OR INOPERATIVE MHE EQUIPMENT
RBN	DAMAGED OR INOPERATIVE CRYOGENIC EQUIPMENT

C-LEVEL REASON CODES

For use with appendices

RBP	SHORTAGE REPAIR PARTS/SPARES(ASL/PLL)X
RBQ	INOPERABLE--SAFETY
RBS	DAMAGED/INOPERABLE--ACCIDENT
RNM	AREA NOT MEASURED BY PARENT SERVICE DIRECTION
RUP	COMMANDER'S JUDGMENT RAISED OVERALL C-LEVEL
S01	AIRCRAFT CONVERSION TO NUCLEAR ORDNANCE INCOMPLETE
S02	AIRCRAFT CONVERSION FOR MINES INCOMPLETE
S03	AIRCRAFT IN STORAGE
S04	AIRCRAFT NOT FULLY EQUIPPED
S05	AIRCRAFT ON LOAN
S06	AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL LOSS
S07	ALLOWED EQUIPMENT AWAY FOR REPAIRS
S08	ALLOWED EQUIPMENT AWAY ON LOAN
S09	ALLOWED EQUIPMENT NEVER RECEIVED
S10	AMMUNITION UNSERVICEABLE SUSPENDED
S11	AWAITING CRITICAL MODIFICATION
S12	COMPONENT LOW-DENSITY END ITEM UNSATISFACTORY
S13	EQUIPMENT IN ADMINISTRATIVE STORAGE
S14	EQUIPMENT REMOVED
S15	MISSILES INOPERATIVE
S16	OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT
S17	ORGANIZATION DECOMMISSIONING DEACTIVATING
S18	ORGANIZATION RECENTLY ACTIVATED REORGANIZED
S19	RADAR EQUIPMENT UNAVAILABLE
S20	SPARES LOW-DENSITY END ITEM UNSATISFACTORY
S21	SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATION DETACHED
S22	SHORTAGE--AMMUNITION
S23	(RESERVED)
S24	SHORTAGE--ATTACHED ELEMENT
S25	SHORTAGE--COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
S26	SHORTAGE--CONSUMABLES
S27	SHORTAGE--MAJOR END-ITEM
S28	SHORTAGE--ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT
S29	SHORTAGE--GENERAL SUPPLY EQUIPMENT
S30	SHORTAGE--PROVISIONS
S31	SHORTAGE--REPAIR PARTS SPARES(ALLOWANCE LIST ITEM)
S32	SHORTAGE--REPAIR PARTS(NOT ALLOWANCE LIST ITEM)
S33	SHORTAGE--REPAIR PARTS(MOUNT OUT)
S34	SHORTAGE--REPAIR PARTS(OPSTK)
S35	SHORTAGE--SECONDARY REPAIRABLE
S36	SHORTAGE--SPECIAL SUPPLY EQUIPMENT
S37	SHORTAGE--STOCK SUPPLY
S38	SHORTAGE--SUPPLY(MARINE CORPS)
S39	SHORTAGE--SUPPLY(NAVY)
S40	SHORTAGE--SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT
S41	SHORTAGE--TEST EQUIPMENT
S42	SHORTAGE--TABLE OF EQUIPMENT
S43	SHORTAGE--VEHICLE(S)
S44	SHORTAGE--WAR READINESS SPARE KITS
S45	SHORTAGE/OFFLOADED--AIRCRAFT
S46	SHORTAGE/OFFLOADED--AMMUNITION AIRSTRIKE
S47	SHORTAGE/OFFLOADED--AMMUNITION GUN
S48	SHORTAGE/OFFLOADED--AMMUNITION ANTIAIR WARFARE
S49	SHORTAGE/OFFLOADED--ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE WEAPONS
S50	SHORTAGE/OFFLOADED--FUEL
S51	SHORTAGE/OFFLOADED--MISSILE(SAM)

C-LEVEL REASON CODES

For use with appendices

S52	SHORTAGE/OFFLOADED--TORPEDO
S53	UNSERVICEABLE--TORPEDO
S54	AIRCRAFT COMBAT LOSS
S55	MISSILES UNSERVICEABLE
S56	INSUFFICIENT FUEL
S57	SHORTAGE OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
S58	SHORTAGE SPARE ENGINES
S59	AMMUNITION--NOT INSPECTED
S60	AMMUNITION--LACK OF UPLOAD EXERCISE
S61	AMMUNITION--DEFICIENCIES IN UPLOAD EXERCISE
S62	PLL/ASL-SHORTAGE ON REQUEST
S63	PLL/ASL-SHORTAGE NOT ON REQUEST
S64	SHORTAGE--NBC EQUIPMENT
S65	AMMUNITION--FAILED INSPECTION
S66	INSUFFICIENT FUNDS
S67	AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED SEPARATE TASKING
S68	SHORTAGE--INDIVIDUAL TOOL KIT
S69	SHORTAGE--MOBILITY BAG
S70	SHORTAGE--FIREFIGHTER PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
S71	SHORTAGE--463L MHE
S72	SHORTAGE--MHE OTHER
S73	SHORTAGE--MOBILITY GEAR(EXCEPT MHE)
S74	SHORTAGE--A/E KITS
S75	SHORTAGE--SHELTERS
S76	SHORTAGE--OPERATING ROOM EQUIPMENT
S77	SHORTAGE--GENERATORS
S78	SHORTAGE--LABORATORY EQUIPMENT
S79	SHORTAGE--HOSPITAL BEDS
S80	SHORTAGE--WEAPONS
S81	SHORTAGE--PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
S82	SHORTAGE--INTRUSION PROTECTION EQUIPMENT
S83	EQUIPMENT ON LOAN
S84	EQUIPMENT DEPLOYED(MISSION SUPPORT)
S85	MAJOR EQUIPMENT IN DEPOT MODIFICATION
S86	MAJOR EQUIPMENT IN LOCAL MODIFICATION
S87	SHORTAGE--BASE LEVEL SELF-SUFFICIENCY SPARES
S88	MAJOR EQUIPMENT IN PROGRAMMED DEPOT MAINTENANCE
S89	SHORTAGE--DX ITEMS AUTHORIZED FOR STORAGE
S90	SHORT COMBAT ESSENTIAL (PACING) ITEMS
S91	UNIT REORGANIZING
S92	EQUIPMENT NOT AVAILABLE DUE TO SCHOOL SUPPORT (TRAINING) MISSION
S93	EQUIPMENT SHORTAGE--SERVICE CONSTRAINT(LOWW ALO TYPE B CADRE UNIT)
S94	NOTIONAL UNIT--NOT MANNED NOT EQUIPPED
S95	UNIT UNDERGOING MAJOR EQUIPMENT CONVERSION
S96	SHORTAGE--REFUELING VEHICLES
S97	SHORTAGE--REFUELING DISPENSING EQUIPMENT
S98	SHORTAGE--CRYOGENIC PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT
S99	SHORTAGE--FIRE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
SAC	UNIT BEING ACTIVATED
SNM	AREA NOT MEASURED BY PARENT SERVICE DIRECTION
SNP	UNIT PLACED IN CADRE STATUS BY PARENT SERVICE
SRD	UNIT BEING REACTIVATED(REORGANIZED)
STW	TRAINING UNIT WITH WARTIME TASKING MISSION
SUM	UNIT NOT MANNED OR EQUIPPED; REQUIRED IN WARTIME STRUCTURE
SUP	COMMANDER'S JUDGMENT RAISED OVERALL C-LEVEL
T01	ADMINISTRATIVE DEADLINE EQUIPMENT

C-LEVEL REASON CODES

For use with appendices

T02	DEADLINE RATE OF MAJOR COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONIC ITEMS RESTRICTS TRAINING
T03	INADEQUATE--ONBOARD TRAINING DEVICES
T04	INADEQUATE--RANGE SERVICES
T05	INADEQUATE--SCHOOL QUOTAS
T06	INADEQUATE--TARGET SERVICES
T07	INADEQUATE--TRAINING AMMUNITION
T08	INADEQUATE--TRAINING AREAS
T09	INCOMPLETE--EXERCISE/INSPECTIONS
T10	INCOMPLETE--FIRING/PROFICIENCY TESTS
T11	INSUFFICIENT--CREWS NOT CATEGORY
T12	INSUFFICIENT--CREWS NOT CATEGORY 1, ENLISTED
T13	INSUFFICIENT--FLIGHT OPERATIONS MARINE AIR CONTROL SQUADRONS
T14	INSUFFICIENT--FLIGHT OPERATIONS MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT
T15	INSUFFICIENT--FUNDING
T16	INSUFFICIENT--NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICERS NOT CATEGORY 1
T17	INSUFFICIENT--PILOTS NOT CATEGORY 1
T18	INSUFFICIENT--TYPE TRAINING TIME
T19	INSPECTION--FAILED INITIAL CERTIFICATION
T20	INSPECTION--FAILED RECERTIFICATIONS
T21	MOS IMBALANCES
T22	NAVAL AVIATION TRAINING OPERATIONS QUALIFICATIONS
T23	OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS
T24	ORGANIZATION ACTIVATING
T25	ORGANIZATION DECOMMISSIONING/DEACTIVATING
T26	ORGANIZATION IN ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT
T27	PERSONNEL NOT CATEGORY 1
T28	PERSONNEL TURNOVER EXCESSIVE
T29	SHORTAGE--AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING
T30	SHORTAGE--CREW CHIEF
T31	SHORTAGE--EQUIPMENT
T32	SHORTAGE--INSTRUCTOR
T33	SHORTAGE--INSTRUCTOR PILOT/AIRCREW
T34	SHORTAGE--LEADERSHIP POSITION PERSONNEL
T35	SHORTAGE--NCO SENIOR
T36	SHORTAGE--OFFICER QUALIFIED
T37	SHORTAGE--PERSONNEL
T38	SHORTAGE--TECHNICAL SKILL PERSONNEL
T39	SQUAD/CREW QUALIFICATION LOW
T40	TESTS--UNSATISFACTORY C-LEVEL
T41	TRAINING INCOMPLETE
T42	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--AIR WARFARE
T43	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
T44	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--ANTIAIR WARFARE
T45	AVIATOR--TRAINING STATUS DEGRADED
T46	NBC DEFENSIVE TRAINING INCOMPLETE
T47	UNIT REORGANIZING
T48	NOTIONAL UNIT--UNMANNED UNEQUIPPED
T49	TRAINING UNIT WITH WARTIME MISSION TASKING CAPABILITY
T50	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--MOBILITY
T51	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--MAJOR EQUIPMENT CONVERSION
T52	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--SPECIAL WARFARE
T53	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--DUE TO SCHOOL SUPPORT MISSION
T54	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--DUE TO SERVICE CONSTRAINT(LOW ALO TYPE B CADRE UNIT)
T55	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATION(S) IN STANDBY STATUS
T56	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--TEAMS
T57	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--FUEL SHORTAGE

C-LEVEL REASON CODES

For use with appendices

T58	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--COMBAT CREWS
T59	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--CREW CHIEF
T60	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--ENLISTED AIRCREW MEMBERS
T61	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--NAVIGATOR/OBSERVER
T62	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--PILOT
T63	PERSONNEL SHORTAGE--OFFICER AIRCREW-OTHER
T64	CASUALTIES
T65	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--NUCLEAR WEAPONS
T66	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--BORROWED MANPOWER
T67	INSPECTION--UNIT HAS NOT PASSED CERTIFICATION INSPECTION
T68	INSUFFICIENT--FLIGHT HOURS
T69	CREWS DEPLOYED SEPARATE TASKING
T70	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--LACK OF AERIAL COMBAT TACTICS
T71	INSUFFICIENT CREWS NOT CATEGORY 1:ENLISTED AIRCREW MEMBERS: LOADMASTERS/FLT ENG
T72	DEGRADED ON-THE-JOB TRAINING PROGRESSION
T73	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--HAZARDOUS CARGO CERTIFIERS
T74	TRAINING INCOMPLETE--MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT OPERATORS
T75	SHORTAGE--FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS ON AIRCREW DUTY
T76	SHORTAGE--FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS ON TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY DUTY
T77	SHORTAGE--WEAPONS CONTROLLERS
T78	SHORTAGE--WEAPONS TECHNICIANS
T79	TRAINING DEGRADED--INADEQUATE SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE, WARNING AREAS
T80	TRAINING DEGRADED--INADEQUATE SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE, RESTRICTED AREAS
T81	TRAINING DEGRADED--INADEQUATE SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE, MILITARY TRAINING ROUTES
T82	TRAINING DEGRADED--INADEQUATE SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE, MILITARY OPERATING AREAS
T83	TRAINING DEGRADED--INADEQUATE SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE, SUPERSONIC AIRSPACE
T84	LANGUAGE INDICATOR CODE IMBALANCES
T85	DLPT SCORES BELOW MINIMUM
T86	DLPT RETEST DELAY (6 MONTHS OR MORE)
T87	COHORT TRAINING
TAC	UNIT BEING ACTIVATED
TCV	UNIT UNDERGOING MAJOR EQUIPMENT CONVERSION/TRANSITION
TNM	AREA NOT MEASURED BY PARENT SERVICE DIRECTION
TNP	UNIT PLACED IN CADRE STATUS BY PARENT SERVICE
TRD	UNIT BEING REACTIVATED (REORGANIZED)
TUM	UNIT NOT MANNED OR EQUIPPED; REQUIRED IN WARTIME STRUCTURE
TUP	COMMANDER'S JUDGMENT RAISED OVERALL C-LEVEL